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Dissents and Concurrences: Seven 
Debates in Charter Jurisprudence 
W. David Rankin & Mahmud Jamal* 
The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms1 15 times in 2012.2 Of these 15 judgments, seven 
— approximately half — featured a dissent or concurrence. This is a 
somewhat higher rate of disagreement than in the Court’s decisions gen-
erally: of the 75 judgments released in 2012, 25 judgments, or one-third, 
were not unanimous. 
This is hardly surprising. The Charter is an open-textured instrument 
— a living tree, drafted for all time — that admits of flexibility and 
growth.3 These are the seeds of dissent. Compounding this, Charter cases 
often spring from the fault lines in Canadian society. The 2012 batch of 
cases is no exception. A woman wears a niqab owing to her sincere 
religious convictions. Must she take it off to testify as the complainant in 
a sexual assault trial? Do employees have a reasonable expectation of 
                                                                                                             
* Both of the Ontario Bar and of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP. The authors thank Sonja 
Pavic, articling student-at-law, for her valuable research assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 This paper reviews only those cases where the Charter was directly in issue. Cases such 
as Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.), in which the Charter 
was used as an interpretative aide, are excluded. Included in the list of cases, however, are all three 
of the unanimous jury selection trilogy cases (R. v. Emms, [2012] S.C.J. No. 74, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 810 
(S.C.C.), R. v. Yumnu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Davey, [2012] 
S.C.J. No. 75, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828 (S.C.C.)). While the Charter is not cited in all three cases, the 
concept of trial fairness directly put ss. 7 and 11(d) at issue. 
3 M.D. Kirby, “Judicial Dissent — Common Law and Civil Law Traditions” (2007) 123 
Law Q. Rev. 379, at 28 (PDF doc) [hereinafter “Kirby”] (referring to the U.S. Constitution); 
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 82 
(S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C.: 
To evoke Lord Sankey’s celebrated phrase in Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, 
[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), at p. 136, the Canadian Charter must be viewed as ‘a living tree 
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits’: see Reference re Provincial 
Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at p. 180, per McLachlin J. 
90 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
privacy in their work computers? Do the presumptions of accuracy and 
identity in the breathalyzer provisions in the Criminal Code4 limit the 
Charter right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty? Reasonable 
persons disagree about these sorts of things, often with conviction. The 
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada can be expected to differ with 
no less passion. 
The following paper takes a closer look at the 2012 dissents. Taking 
the lead of Scalia J. of the United States Supreme Court, we define dis-
sents to include what are technically concurrences. “[T]here is little 
difference” between them, Justice Scalia explains. “Legal opinions are 
important … for the reasons they give, not the results they announce.”5 
Our objective is to study those reasons — to identify the rifts, the lan-
guage and the trends in the 2012 Charter dissents. We begin by 
discussing the role of dissents in Charter cases generally. We then review 
the seven Charter debates that the Court could not resolve unanimously 
in 2012. 
I. THE ROLE OF DISSENTS IN CHARTER CASES 
Chief Justice McLachlin has noted that “the Charter is engrafted 
onto the living tree that is the Canadian constitution”.6 This principle has 
been recognized since the earliest days of Charter jurisprudence.7 If the 
Charter is “a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its 
natural limits”,8 it should come as no surprise that reasonable people will 
disagree on how it ought to grow — how far its branches ought to reach; 
how it ought to shoot and blossom. This is the nature of the Charter, with 
its broad, open language. Dissents and differing approaches are to be 
expected.  
These expectations of divergence are borne out by experience. Since 
its adoption, the Charter has given rise to above average levels of dis-
agreement within the highest court. In his 2004 study, Peter McCormick 
explains how the growing number of Charter cases on the docket resulted 
                                                                                                             
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”]. 
5 A. Scalia, “The Dissenting Opinion” (1994) J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 33 [hereinafter “Scalia”]. 
6 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 
2 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J. (as she then was). 
7 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155-56 (S.C.C.), 
Dickson J. (as he then was). 
8 Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124, 136 
(J.C.P.C.), Viscount Sankey. 
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in a steady rise in non-unanimous decisions, starting with the Dickson 
Court, and then into the Lamer and McLachlin Courts.9 As the Charter 
matured, however, the distinctiveness of a Charter dissent (as compared 
to other types of dissents) was seen to diminish. On the Dickson Court, 
Charter cases were 2.5 times as likely to be split, whereas this figure 
shrank to 1.5 times during the Lamer Court — and 1.4 times in the first 
two years of the McLachlin Court.10 In 2012, our year of focus, Charter 
cases were about 1.4 times more likely than non-Charter cases to give 
rise to a dissent. 
This enhanced rate of divergence must be understood in light of the 
distinctive role of Charter dissents. Former Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, 
building on the work of Brennan J., formerly of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
articulated three principal goals of a dissent: to prophesize, to stir 
dialogue, and to safeguard the integrity of the law and judicial 
institutions.11 Each of these functions takes on a special dimension, and 
increased importance, in the realm of Charter jurisprudence. 
Take the prophetic role of a dissent. There are many celebrated 
examples of dissents and concurring reasons becoming the law in later 
cases.12 As L’Heureux-Dubé J. has phrased it, “dissenting opinions are 
often intended more for the legal minds of tomorrow than for those of 
today”.13 As Canadian law incrementally develops — and as the living 
tree of the Constitution grows — dissents of the past may reflect the 
law of the future. The great dissenters, the ones who foresee these 
                                                                                                             
9 Peter McCormick, “Blocks, Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the 
Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 25, 28, 30 [hereinafter 
“McCormick”].  
10 Id., at 26, 28, 30. 
11 Hon. C. L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” (2000) 
38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 495 [hereinafter “L’Heureux-Dubé”]; see also Hon. W.J. Brennan Jr., “In 
Defense of Dissents” (1986) 37 Hastings L.J. 427 [hereinafter “Brennan”]. 
12 See, e.g., Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1973] S.C.J. No. 150, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Murdoch”], Laskin J. (as he then was) (dissenting), adopted in Rathwell v. Rathwell, 
[1978] S.C.J. No. 14, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436 (S.C.C.), Dickson J. (as he then was) (plurality), later 
adopted in Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] S.C.J. No. 103, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.), Dickson J. (as he 
then was) (majority). 
13 L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 508-509. See also Hon. R. Bader Ginsburg, “The 
Role of Dissenting Opinions” (2010) 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1, at 4 [hereinafter “Ginsburg”] 
(“Describing the external impact of dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Hughes famously said: 
‘A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal … to the intelligence of a future day, when a later 
decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have 
been betrayed.”). 
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developments and who live them in the present, have been artfully styled 
the “Prophets with Honor” within the legal system.14 
Prophetic dissents are not limited to Charter or constitutional cases. 
One need only consider the dissent of Laskin J., as he then was, in 
Murdoch v. Murdoch,15 or the prophetic dissents penned by L’Heureux-
Dubé J. as she gradually moved parts of Canadian law in the direction of 
gender equality.16 But prophecy has a special role where Charter values 
are at stake. The living tree doctrine recognizes that there will be a future 
audience of constitutional opinions that will not necessarily share the 
constraints of our more dated institutions.17 Charter dissents will 
continue to facilitate the “gradual liberalization of constitutional 
interpretation”.18 
Consider United States v. Burns, where the Court unanimously held 
that it would breach section 7 of the Charter to extradite an accused 
person to a retentionist state without an assurance that the death-penalty 
would not be sought (except in “exceptional” cases).19 This decision 
effectively foreclosed the death penalty in Canada, but it was not the first 
time that the Court had considered the issue. A decade earlier, in Kindler 
v. Canada (Minister of Justice) and Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), 
the Court reached the opposite result in two deeply divided 4-3 splits 
(each in four opinions).20 Though the Court in Burns did not expressly 
                                                                                                             
14 A. Barth, Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the Supreme 
Court (New York: Knopf, 1974); Brennan, supra, note 11, at 432 (“Justice Harlan transcended, 
without slighting, mechanical legal analysis; he sought to announce fundamental constitutional truths 
as well. He spoke not only to his peers, but to his society, and, more importantly, across time to later 
generations. He was, in this sense, a secular prophet, and we continue […] to benefit from his 
wisdom and courage.”). 
15 See supra, note 12. See also L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 505. 
16 See, e.g., R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“O’Connor”]. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was a significant proponent of dissents. On the occasion of 
her retirement from the Supreme Court, she remarked that “[d]issents are a positive force which 
enhances collegiality, provides the legal community with alternatives, [and] influences majority 
rulings …”: “Remarks of the Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé at the Ceremony to mark her 
Retirement”, June 10, 2002. 
17 It is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada can and will revisit its past Charter decisions 
when there are “compelling reasons to do so”: R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, 
at para. 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Henry”], Binnie J. 
18 L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 508. 
19 United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.). 
20 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 
(S.C.C.); Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.). 
See Henry, supra, note 17, at para. 44, Binnie J.: 
In Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680, it was said that “[t]his 
Court has made it clear that constitutional decisions are not immutable, even in the 
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endorse any of the dissents in Kindler or Ng, it was no doubt easier to 
effectively overturn these precedents given how they splintered. 
Though the doctrine of the living tree is not as firmly planted in the 
soils of our neighbours to the south, Brennan J. put to words — and to 
practice — a similar view. “Because we Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court are the last word on the meaning of the Constitution,” he 
wrote, “our views must be subject to revision over time, or the 
Constitution falls captive to the anachronistic views of long-gone 
generations”.21 Dissents in a court of last resort signal to lower courts, 
the bar, and society where (at least in the opinion of the dissenting judge) 
constitutional law is or ought to be moving.22 
The first role of Charter dissents is related to the second — the facili-
tation of dialogue. Dissents, in general, stir debate in many circles: 
professional, societal, academic, legislative, and international.23 They 
sharpen majority decisions and, by setting out both sides of the debate, 
they keep the court “in the forefront of the intellectual development of 
the law”.24 In some cases, they even seek to interface directly with the 
profession and courts below, for example, by showing how to distinguish 
the majority’s reasons.25 
Charter dissents share all of these features, perhaps taking on addi-
tional significance. Almost by definition, Charter cases are of particular 
interest in a democratic society. They engage societal values that are 
shaped and developed through dialogue between the courts, through their 
reasons, and society, through the bar. Dissents are a fundamental part of 
this forward-looking conversation. They are reported in our media, de-
bated in our law schools, and quoted in our legislative institutions.26 
                                                                                                             
absence of constitutional amendment” (p. 704), and in the Charter context the Court in 
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, effectively overturned the 
result (if not the reasoning) in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 
and Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858. 
21 Brennan, supra, note 11, at 437. 
22 Scalia, supra, note 5, at 5 (A 5-4 dissent “at least in constitutional cases (in which, under 
the practice of our Court, the doctrine of stare decisis — i.e., adhering to precedent — is less 
rigorously observed) emboldens counsel in later cases to try again, and to urge an overruling — 
which sometimes, although rarely, occurs.”). 
23 L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 509-12. 
24 Scalia, supra, note 5, at 7; Ginsburg, supra, note 13, at 3. See also L’Heureux-Dubé, 
supra, note 11, at 515. 
25 Brennan, supra, note 11, at 430. 
26 See, e.g., House of Commons Debates (Hansard), Vol. 145, No. 29, 3rd Sess., 40th, Parl., 
April 20, 2010, at 1763, quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 630 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”], Cory J. (dissenting). See also 
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As Charter jurisprudence is informed by societal values,27 and as dissents 
inspire dialogue that may shape them, they have a sort of “feedback ef-
fect” within society.28 
We come, then, to Charter dissents as a safeguard of integrity and 
judicial institutions. As L’Heureux-Dubé J. has explained, dissents 
“enhance the judiciary’s legitimacy by preserving and strengthening 
judicial independence, by fostering collegiality among judges and by 
enhancing the coherence of courts’ decisions”.29 In the Canadian system, 
it is each justice’s prerogative to express his or her own opinion. This is 
an essential element of judicial independence,30 and it is an experience 
                                                                                                             
the discussion of L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 510-11 (discussing the influence of minority 
reasons on legislative developments following O’Connor, supra, note 16). 
27 See Rodriguez, id., at 607, Sopinka J.: 
While the principles of fundamental justice are concerned with more than process, refer-
ence must be made to principles which are “fundamental” in the sense that they would 
have general acceptance among reasonable people. From the review that I have con-
ducted above, I am unable to discern anything approaching unanimity with respect to the 
issue before us. 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 
at paras. 49-50 (S.C.C.), per curiam (“Without resorting to opinion polls, which may vary with the 
mood of the moment, is the conduct fundamentally unacceptable to our notions of fair practice and 
justice?”; “It can be confidently stated that Canadians do not accept torture as fair or compatible with 
justice”). 
28 This concept of dialogue is related to that put forward in Peter W. Hogg & Allison 
A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of 
Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75: 
Where a judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification, or avoidance, then 
it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court and the competent legisla-
tive body as a dialogue. In that case, the judicial decision causes a public debate in which 
Charter values play a more prominent role than they would if there had been no judicial 
decision. The legislative body is in a position to devise a response that is properly re-
spectful of the Charter values that have been identified by the Court, but which 
accomplishes the social or economic objectives that the judicial decision has impeded.  
See also Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, “Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. The concept of dialogue discussed here is broader, however, in that it does 
not necessarily entail the involvement of a legislative body or a legislative response. 
29 L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 512-13. 
30 This is in contrast to other judicial systems where dissents are not accepted, such as in the 
French Cour de Cassation or the European Court of Justice: see Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, “The common 
law and Europe: differences of style or substance and do they matter?”, The Holdsworth Address 
(2007). Seriatim decisions are no longer in vogue in Canada, but we continue to place a premium on 
judges’ individual independence. This approach stems from the tradition of the House of Lords. 
Though our system once had at its peak the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (which 
delivered unanimous decisions throughout its history as Canada’s court of last resort), its historical 
division from the House of Lords explained its need for unanimity. Unlike with appeals to the House 
of Lords (originally a parliamentary body), appeals to the Privy Council (an executive body) were 
resolved in the form of advice to the monarch. At least until 1966, it was considered unseemly to 
embarrass the monarch with conflicting advice: Kirby, supra, note 3, at 14. 
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lived out to a particular degree in Charter jurisprudence. The “fierce 
independence” of our justices is especially pronounced when it comes to 
the Constitution.31 
Moreover, Charter cases often fall along the fault lines of Canadian 
society, sometimes even containing a moral element. In these cases, dis-
sents may be necessary to the justices so as to preserve their personal 
integrities.32 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, herself no stranger to vigorous 
dissent, put it plainly: “[I]magine the internal conflicts and the frustration 
experienced by judges faced with a total inability to express their pro-
found disagreement.”33 Justice Brennan, who by one count dissented in 
2,100 death penalty cases,34 had a similar view.35 “[I]t would be a great 
mistake,” he wrote, “to confuse [the] unquestioned duty to obey and re-
spect the law with an imagined obligation to subsume entirely one’s own 
views of constitutional imperatives to the views of the majority”.36 
The connection between dissents and justices’ personal integrity is 
most clearly expressed with “perpetual dissents” — that is, the practice 
of continuing to dissent after the majority has decided the point.37 
Though not as much a part of the Canadian experience as it is in the 
United States, we do have a less barefaced version of the perpetual 
dissent. Canadian judges often continue to subscribe to approaches that 
did not gain majority favour, and may choose not to expand the holding 
of a decision in which they dissented. Some of this can be found in the 
dissents released in 2012. 
II. CHARTER DISSENTS IN 2012 
1. L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes38 
The first Charter decision of the year, and the first Charter “dissent”, 
was not a dissent at all — but a concurrence. Justice Deschamps wrote 
for a majority consisting of herself, the Chief Justice, and Binnie, Abella, 
                                                                                                             
31 L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 501. 
32 Id., at 513. 
33 Id. 
34 A.O. Larsen, “Perpetual Dissents” (2008) College of William & Mary Law School 
Faculty Publications, Paper 46, at 451 [hereinafter “Larsen”]. 
35 Brennan, supra, note 11, at 437. 
36 Id. 
37 Larsen, supra, note 34, at 447. 
38 [2012] S.C.J. No. 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “L. (S.)”]. 
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Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. Justice LeBel (Fish J. concurring) 
agreed in the outcome, but for different reasons. 
The appellants in L. (S.) argued that a school board’s refusal to 
exempt children from a mandatory comparative religion program (the 
Ethics and Religious Culture Program) infringed their rights under 
section 2(a) of the Charter (and section 3 of the Quebec Charter of 
human rights and freedoms).39 The court at first instance found that the 
parents’ rights had not been infringed (or at least that the parents had 
failed to prove otherwise). The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appellants’ appeal as of right and their motion for leave to appeal.40 
For the majority, Deschamps J. stressed the necessity for the state to 
remain neutral when it comes to religion.41 The test, in her view, is “not 
whether the person sincerely believes that a religious practice or belief has 
been infringed, but whether a religious practice or belief exists that has 
been infringed”.42 There is a subjective element to this test, but it is limited 
to determining whether the person has a “sincere belief that has a nexus 
with religion”.43 The appellants in L. (S.) sincerely believed that they had a 
religious obligation to pass on the teachings of Catholicism to their 
children, but failed to prove (objectively) that the impugned program 
interfered with that obligation. In Deschamps J.’s view, “exposing children 
to ‘a comprehensive presentation of various religions without forcing the 
children to join them’ [cannot constitute] in itself an indoctrination of 
students that would infringe the appellants’ freedom of religion”.44 
Justice LeBel agreed in the result, but elected to pen a minority 
opinion. In his view, the specific record in L. (S.) did not permit the 
conclusion that either the program infringed the appellants’ rights or that 
its implementation could not, in the future, infringe the freedom of 
religion guarantee.45 There was simply inadequate evidence of what the 
implementation of the program would actually mean in Quebec 
classrooms. His reasons are clear that he did not intend to finally uphold 
the constitutional validity of the challenged program.46 
                                                                                                             
39 R.S.Q. c. C-12. 
40 [2010] J.Q. no 1355, 2010 QCCA 348 (Que. C.A.); [2010] J.Q. no 1356, 2010 QCCA 
349 (Que. C.A.); [2010] J.Q. no 1357, 2010 QCCA 346 (Que. C.A.). 
41 L. (S.), supra, note 38, at para. 19. 
42 Id., at para. 24. 
43 Id. 
44 Id., at para. 37. 
45 Id., at para. 58. 
46 Id., at para. 44. 
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The “compact”47 minority reasons of LeBel J. are perhaps best 
understood for their dialogic function. The majority does not expressly 
state that the comparative religion program at issue could not, in the 
future, be challenged. By explicitly leaving open the constitutional 
validity of the program, LeBel J. may have intended to signal this to the 
profession (and to the lower courts in Quebec). Bring evidence of the 
program’s implementation, he effectively says, and try again. His opinion 
may also have been intended to signal to Quebec school authorities that 
they must ensure that they implement the program in a Charter-compliant 
way. Put otherwise, their success on appeal should not be taken as an 
absolute endorsement of the Ethics and Religious Culture Program. 
2. R. v. Cole48 
The first true Charter dissent in 2012 was that of Abella J. in R. v. 
Cole. Writing for herself (an “outlier”, to use McCormick’s terminology), 
Abella J. dissented on the application of section 24(2) to the facts of the 
specific case — expressing her view that the Court of Appeal was correct 
to exclude the unconstitutionally obtained computer evidence. Justice 
Fish (writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and LeBel, Rothstein, 
Cromwell and Moldaver JJ.) wrote to allow the appeal and admit the 
evidence. 
The significance of Cole is not in its application of section 24(2), but 
in its treatment of section 8. The essential issue was whether the accused 
person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the informational con-
tent of a laptop issued to him by his employer (a school board). 
Technicians found contraband images on the hard drive, and authorities 
turned the computer material over to the police, who then searched it 
without a warrant. The accused argued that the police had thereby 
breached his rights under section 8 of the Charter.49 
For the majority, Fish J. agreed that the police had breached section 8. 
Even though the accused did not own the laptop, he had a reasonable 
(albeit diminished) expectation of privacy in the personal information he 
kept on it. Section 8 was thus engaged, and the Crown was not able to 
point to any law authorizing the warrantless search by the police. They 
were not permitted to piggyback on the authority of the school officials 
                                                                                                             
47 That is, a single minority opinion signed by two judges: see McCormick, supra, note 9, at 15. 
48 [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”]. 
49 Id., at paras. 5-8. 
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to search the laptop, nor did the employer’s purported third party consent 
have any legal bearing.50 
Despite the infringement of the accused’s section 8 rights, however, 
Fish J. decided that the unconstitutionally obtained evidence should not 
be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. Applying the framework 
in R. v. Grant,51 he found that the admission of the evidence would not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.52 The courts below had 
erred in concluding that the conduct of the officer was “egregious” and 
serious enough to favour exclusion,53 and they failed to properly take 
into account the diminished nature of the privacy interest or the “discov-
erability” of the evidence.54 
It was on this issue that Abella J. registered her sole dissent. In her 
view, the evidence supported the trial judge’s conclusions regarding the 
conduct of the officer, and she relied heavily on extracts from the record 
to support this position.55 She was also of the view that the search was 
highly intrusive (in its extent) regardless of whether there was a dimin-
ished reasonable expectation of privacy in the laptop in question.56 
It is unlikely that Abella J.’s dissent will have a prophetic or dialogic 
function. Time will only tell, of course, but her disagreement had more to 
do with her reading of the record than any profoundly different view of 
the law. This is not to say that her dissent is not important. As noted, one 
of the purposes for dissents in the Canadian system is to enhance trans-
parency and to preserve the personal integrity of the justices. Justice 
Abella’s dissent does both. She was unable to agree with the majority on 
their understanding of the evidence, and she registered her views on the 
public record. 
Transparency and personal integrity are institutionally valuable, 
provided that the dissent does not attempt to deprive the majority reasons 
of their legitimacy. In the case of Abella J.’s dissent in Cole, however, 
this is not a concern. There has recently been some attention paid to the 
speech acts of dissenting judges.57 Justice Abella employs not just one, 
                                                                                                             
50 Id., at paras. 8-10. 
51 [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.). 
52 Cole, supra, note 48, at para. 97. 
53 Id., at paras. 84-85. 
54 Id., at paras. 92-93. 
55 Id., at paras. 115-119. 
56 Id., at para. 126. 
57 “From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the ‘Respectful’ Dissent” (Note) (2011) 
124 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 [hereinafter “From Consensus”]. 
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but two, of the speech acts associated with dissents that are not intended 
to undermine the majority: First, she prefaces her specific points of 
dissent with the language of “respect”.58 This practice may seem to be a 
matter of course for the justices of the Supreme Court, but it is 
nevertheless a significant act. Phrases like “with respect” and “in my 
respectful view” soften the language of the dissenting opinion and 
contrast with the sort of sharply worded “assertive dissents” occasionally 
seen in the U.S.59 
Second, Abella J. uses outcome-oriented language (“I would dismiss 
the appeal”).60 Much like the practice of Ginsburg J. of the U.S. Supreme 
Court,61 Abella J.’s dissent employs non-confrontational, outcome-
directed language that does not risk “jeopardizing collegiality or public 
respect for and confidence in the judiciary”.62 
3. R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux63 
We come then to St-Onge Lamoureux, where the Court was asked to 
assess certain provisions of the Criminal Code drinking and driving 
scheme for Charter compliance. Justice Deschamps again wrote for the 
majority (herself, the Chief Justice and LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ.), hold-
ing that while the provisions violated section 11(d) of the Charter, they 
were justified under section 1 after certain words were severed. Justice 
Cromwell (writing also for Rothstein J.) would have found the provisions 
Charter compliant. 
The provisions at issue, sections 258(1)(c), 258(1)(d.01), and 
258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code,64 together established several 
presumptions regarding breathalyzer devices. First, the analysis was 
                                                                                                             
58 Cole, supra, note 48, at paras. 107, 115.  
59 “From Consensus”, supra, note 57, at 1322-25. “Assertive dissents” use bare, 
confrontational language such as “I dissent” or “I must dissent”. 
60 Cole, supra, note 48, at para. 136.  
61 “From Consensus”, supra, note 57, at 1324. 
62 Hon. R. Bader Ginsburg, “Speaking in a Judicial Voice” (1992) 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 
at 1196 [hereinafter “Ginsburg, ‘Speaking in a Judicial Voice’”]: 
The most effective dissent, I am convinced, ‘stand[s] on its own legal footing’[footnote 
omitted] it spells out differences without jeopardizing collegiality or public respect for 
and confidence in the judiciary. I try to write my few separate opinions each year as I 
once did briefs for appellees — as affirmative statements of my reasons, drafted before 
receiving the court’s opinion, and later adjusted, as needed, to meet the majority’s 
presentation. 
63 [2012] S.C.J. No. 57, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 187 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “St-Onge Lamoureux”]. 
64 Supra, note 4. 
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presumed to be accurate and to reflect the accused’s blood-alcohol level at 
the time he or she was driving, unless there was evidence tending to show 
that: (1) the device was malfunctioning or was operated improperly; (2) 
that the malfunction resulted in a blood-alcohol reading in excess of the 
legal limit; and (3) that the accused’s blood alcohol level would not have 
exceeded the legal limit when behind the wheel (section 258(1)(c)). 
The evidence tending to show malfunction or improper operation was 
restricted, however, in that it could not include evidence of the amount 
of alcohol consumed; the absorption rate in the accused’s body; or a 
calculation based on that evidence (section 258(1)(d.01)). Finally, if the 
test registered blood-alcohol levels over the legal limit, this was 
presumed to be proof that the blood-alcohol levels of the accused were 
over 80 at the time he or she was actually driving, unless evidence was 
presented tending to show that the accused’s consumption of alcohol 
was consistent with both a concentration of alcohol below the legal 
limit at the time of driving and a concentration over the limit at the 
time of testing (section 258(1)(d.1)). The respondent in St-Onge 
Lamoureux argued that these provisions infringed sections 7, 11(c) and 
11(d) of the Charter. 
The majority and the minority agreed that section 258(1)(c) and (d.01) 
did not infringe section 7 of the Charter, and that section 258(1)(d.1) 
did not abridge the protection against self-incrimination in section 11(c).65 
They could not agree, however, whether the challenged provisions were 
consistent with the section 11(d) right to be presumed innocent. 
The majority concluded that section 258(1)(c) and (d.01) infringed 
this right because, unless the accused rebuts the statutory presumptions, 
the trier of fact would be bound to convict notwithstanding that he or she 
might have a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the breathalyzer test. 
Moreover, section 258(1)(d.1) infringed the right to be presumed innocent 
because, unless the presumption was rebutted, the trier of fact would have 
to convict even though he or she had a reasonable doubt that the accused’s 
blood alcohol was over 80 at the time she was actually driving (say, 
because the accused drank shortly before being pulled over, so that the 
alcohol did not absorb into the blood until after being stopped).66 
Having found that the impugned provisions impinged section 11(d), 
Deschamps J. proceeded to section 1. In her view, section 258(1)(d.01)  
                                                                                                             
65 St-Onge Lamoureux, supra, note 63, at para. 123. Justice Cromwell agreed regarding s. 7 
for differing reasons: at paras. 126-139. 
66 Id., at paras. 27, 85. 
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and (d.1) were demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society 
under section 1 of the Charter. So, too, was the first requirement in section 
258(1)(c) to rebut the presumption of accuracy (that is, the requirement to 
present evidence of a malfunction or improper operation). However, with 
the first requirement in place, the others went too far to be justified, and 
they were accordingly severed from section 258(1)(c).67 
Justice Cromwell’s application of section 11(d) was quite different 
from the majority’s. Though he “essential[ly]” agreed with Deschamps J. 
regarding what the section 11(d) right entailed, he took the view that none 
of the impugned provisions infringed it.68 To him, the section 11(d) 
analysis required the Court to answer two questions: (1) if the breathalyzer 
analysis was conducted as required in the Criminal Code and resulted in 
a blood alcohol reading over 80, would it be reasonable for the trier of 
fact to doubt that the accused was over 80 at the time of the test, in the 
absence of evidence raising a doubt regarding whether the improper 
operation or malfunctioning of the device produced a result over 80? And 
(2) if the accused’s blood alcohol level at the time of the test was over 
80, would a reasonable trier of fact have any doubt that the blood alcohol 
level was in fact over 80 at the time the accused was driving, absent 
evidence to the contrary? In his view, in light of the evidence of 
reliability and accuracy of breathalyzer tests when conducted according 
to the statutory requirements, the answer to both of these questions was 
“no”. The challenged provisions did not create a risk of conviction in the 
face of reasonable doubt, and, as such, did not limit the presumption of 
innocence in section 11(d).69 
Justice Cromwell’s dissent may prove to have some “prophetic” ele-
ment — not in its application to the particular Criminal Code provisions 
in issue, but for its articulation of the test under section 11(d). In contrast 
to Deschamps J.’s reasons, Cromwell J. gave the analysis more structure 
(and lower courts more guidance) on this area of the law. It would not be 
surprising to see his articulation of the steps of the section 11(d) analysis 
adopted in future cases.70 Justice Cromwell’s statement of the law was 
                                                                                                             
67 Id., at paras. 59, 63, 67. 
68 Id., at para. 145. 
69 Id., at paras. 166-167, 171-174. 
70 See particularly, id., at para. 151, where he set out the need to: (1) determine the true 
nature and scope of the impugned provision; (2) determine the risk of conviction in the presence of 
reasonable doubt; and (3) apply the Vaillancourt “inexorably leads” test (R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.)) only if the statute purports to substitute an element for a 
constitutionally required element of the offence. 
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not inconsistent with the majority’s approach, and has the benefit of be-
ing more transparent and easier to apply. Moreover, by occasionally 
interpreting the majority reasons, Cromwell J. expressly seeks to provide 
guidance to future litigants.71 
4. R. v. Dineley72 
St-Onge Lamoureux was heard together with Dineley, another drunk 
driving case, which also resulted in a Deschamps-Cromwell split. The 
only judge to switch camps was the Chief Justice, who, along with 
Rothstein J., joined Cromwell J.’s dissent. Justices LeBel, Fish and 
Abella again joined Deschamps J.’s majority reasons. 
Dineley involved some of the same provisions as in St-Onge 
Lamoureux, but questioned the different issue of whether they operated 
retrospectively.73 Justice Deschamps’ slim majority held that they did not 
on the basis that new legislation that affects substantive rights is 
presumed not to have retrospective application unless Parliament clearly 
intended otherwise. Applied to Dineley, the new provisions affected the 
availability of the “Carter defence” (using a toxicology report to 
challenge the accuracy of a breathalyzer).74 As this defence was no 
longer sufficient to rebut the statutory presumptions, the amendments 
affected substantive rights. Moreover, the amendments affected 
constitutional rights, which are necessarily substantive. In Deschamps J.’s 
view, therefore, the general rule against retrospective operation ought to 
be applied.75 
                                                                                                             
71 Brennan, supra, note 11, at 430. See, for example, St-Onge Lamoureux, supra, note 63, 
at para.136, where Cromwell J. states that he “do[es] not understand” Deschamps J.’s reasons “to be 
establishing any new principle in relation to the Crown’s obligation to make disclosure to the defence.” 
72 [2012] S.C.J. No. 58, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dineley”]. 
73 Id., only concerned ss. 258(1)(c) and 258(1)(d.01), not s. 258(1)(d.1). 
74 See R. v. Carter, [1985] O.J. No. 1390, 19 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Ont. C.A.). In that case, 
Finlayson J.A. held that “any evidence as to how much alcohol the person tested had in fact 
consumed is relevant evidence and if accepted can raise a doubt as to the accuracy of the 
breathalyzer reading”, or, in that case, the blood-sample reading. The trial judge accepted that the 
accused had only three beers during the relevant time, and the Crown’s expert conceded that this 
quantity of alcohol would have resulted in no reading at all. The “Carter defence”, as it came to be 
known, involved presenting sworn testimony as to the amount of alcohol consumed by the accused, 
together with evidence from a toxicologist that this amount of alcohol would not have resulted in a 
blood-alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml. Prior to the amendments to the Code, this could 
constitute “evidence to the contrary” and raise a reasonable doubt. See St-Onge Lamoureux, supra, 
note 63, at para. 7. 
75 Dineley, supra, note 72, at paras. 10, 17-18, 21.  
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Justice Cromwell took a different view. He framed the question as 
whether the provisions were procedural in nature. It is a presumption of 
legislative intent, he explained, that the procedural provisions of a statute 
should apply from the moment of enactment — and the amendments at 
issue were purely procedural. They were evidentiary and did not change 
the elements of the offence. Moreover, he “respectfully” disagreed with 
Deschamps J. that the amendments eliminated a defence. The “Carter 
defence” was, in his view, nothing more than a type of evidence put for-
ward to raise a reasonable doubt. That the evidentiary provisions 
increased the risk of conviction did not make them substantive. Finally, 
he rejected Deschamps J.’s view that the impugned provisions must be 
substantive because they infringe section 11(d) of the Charter. Procedural 
provisions, too, may infringe Charter rights. In any event, Cromwell J. 
held, the Code provisions as they stood following the Court’s decision in 
St-Onge Lamoureux did not violate the Charter.76 
Note that Cromwell J.’s dissent is not a “perpetual dissent”. He dis-
sented in the concurrently released St-Onge Lamoureux, but he agreed in 
Dineley that the retrospectivity of the provisions should be assessed in 
their post-St-Onge Lamoureux form.77 Unlike the approach of some Jus-
tices on the U.S. Supreme Court,78 Cromwell J. thus accepted the result 
in St-Onge Lamoureux and moved on. 
5. R. v. Nedelcu79 
In Nedelcu the Court split on the interpretation of one of its past 
Charter decisions. R. v. Henry80 was a 2005 unanimous decision in which 
the Court explained and clarified the law pertaining to section 13 of the 
Charter — the protection against using compelled testimony against a 
person in another proceeding. In Nedelcu, Moldaver J. (with the Chief 
Justice and Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ.) took one 
view of Henry. Dissenting, LeBel J. (with Fish and Cromwell JJ.) took 
another. 
In Nedelcu, the trial judge allowed the Crown to cross-examine the 
accused on prior inconsistent statements made during examination for 
                                                                                                             
76 Id., at paras. 21, 43, 67-68, 70, 73. 
77 Id., at para. 73. 
78 Larsen, supra, note 34, at 464. 
79 [2012] S.C.J. No. 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nedelcu”]. 
80 Supra, note 17. 
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discovery in a tort proceeding — for the purpose of impeaching his 
credibility. The statements were not themselves incriminatory. Rather, he 
testified in the tort action that he had no memory of the events in ques-
tion, whereas, in his criminal trial, he gave a detailed account of the 
accident. The criminal trial judge disregarded the accused’s testimony 
and entered a conviction.81 
The majority and dissent agreed that the accused had been compelled 
to testify during discovery in the tort proceeding. They split, however, on 
whether section 13 of the Charter protected the accused from being 
cross-examined on his inconsistent statements from the tort proceeding at 
the criminal trial. The Court of Appeal had held, on the basis of Henry, 
that the cross-examination was impermissible and that his rights had 
been infringed.82 
For the majority, Moldaver J. would have allowed the appeal. In his 
view, a person can only invoke the protection of section 13 of the Charter 
if, at the prior proceeding, he or she: (1) gave “incriminating evidence”, 
(2) under compulsion. For him, “incriminating evidence”, for the 
purposes of section 13 of the Charter, means “evidence given by the 
witness at the prior proceeding that the Crown could use at the 
subsequent proceeding, if it were permitted to do so, to prove guilt”.83 If 
the prior evidence would be incriminating at the subsequent trial, then 
the Crown cannot use it for any purpose at that subsequent trial — that 
is, not to prove guilt or to impeach credibility — except in a prosecution 
for perjury. In this case, the accused’s prior testimony was not 
“incriminating” in this sense, so it was open to the Crown to put it to him 
on cross-examination to impeach his credibility. None of this, according 
to Moldaver J., was inconsistent with the decision in Henry.84  
According to LeBel J., however, the majority’s approach would re-
sult in overturning Henry, or, at least, revisiting the principles it 
established. That case was clear in rejecting any distinction, for the pur-
poses of section 13 of the Charter, between using compelled testimony to 
impeach or to incriminate. Moreover, Binnie J. implicitly rejected as un-
realistic any distinction between “incriminating” and “innocuous” 
statements. As LeBel J. explains, the focus in Henry was on whether the 
witness was compelled, not the nature of the statements made. Justice 
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Moldaver’s approach of drawing distinctions based on the nature of the 
statement is both inconsistent with Henry, and, as the minority argument 
goes, unworkable and unrealistic in practice.85 
The split in Nedelcu was almost exclusively concerned with the in-
terpretation of the Court’s prior unanimous decision in Henry. Four new 
judges had been appointed to the Court between Henry and Nedelcu.86 
Still, however, most of the members of the panel in Nedelcu also sat on 
Henry (five of the nine). For the majority in Nedelcu, the Chief Justice 
and Deschamps and Abella JJ. sat on Henry; for the dissent, there were 
LeBel and Fish JJ. All five of these judges joined the same decision in 
2005, but, seven years later, they were split 3-2. 
The minority reasons claim that the majority reinterpreted and re-
versed Henry; the majority reasons assert that Henry could not have 
meant what the minority says. The minority counters that the majority’s 
reasons are “unsupported” by the case law, “not raised” by the parties, 
and “entirely contrary” to the Crown’s position on the appeal.87 Never-
theless, both sides of the debate couched their rhetoric in the language of 
“respect”.88 As noted alongside Cole, speech acts like this maintain the 
legitimacy of the majority reasons — even if those reasons do, as put 
against the majority, reinterpret recent case law. 
6. R. v. Aucoin89 
Nedelcu was released in November 2012. So, too, was another 
Moldaver-LeBel split: Aucoin. Like in Cole, all of the judges agreed that 
there was a breach of section 8 on the facts of the case. Writing for 
himself and Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ., 
Moldaver J. held that the unconstitutionally obtained cocaine should be 
admitted into evidence. Justice Fish joined with LeBel J. in the view that 
it should be excluded. This time, Fish and Abella JJ. were on the opposite 
sides of the section 24(2) question — underscoring how case specific the 
application of that provision has become. 
In Aucoin, the accused was pulled over for driving a vehicle with a 
mismatched licence plate (a regulatory offence). The officer smelled 
                                                                                                             
85 Id., at paras. 72, 110, 131, 134. 
86 Justices Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis. 
87 Nedelcu, supra, note 79, at para. 127. 
88 Id., at paras. 26, 40, 126. 
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alcohol on the detained man’s breath, which led him to conduct a 
roadside-screening test. The test registered 20 mg of alcohol per 100 mL 
of blood — well under the criminal limit, but over the zero tolerance 
policy for newly licensed drivers, like Mr. Aucoin, in Nova Scotia. The 
officer proceeded to detain the accused for the purpose of issuing him a 
summary offence ticket. Apparently because of the poor lighting and his 
fear that the accused might just “walk away”, the officer decided to place 
Mr. Aucoin in the back of the police cruiser — with the door closed and 
locked — as he himself wrote up the ticket in the front seat. Before doing 
so, he decided to conduct a pat-down search of the accused for “safety 
reasons”. This search led to the discovery of cocaine, some cash, and 
Mr. Aucoin’s arrest. 
The majority and minority disagreed on how the officer infringed 
Mr. Aucoin’s Charter rights. For Moldaver J., the breach occurred when 
the officer decided to place the accused in the back of the cruiser. The 
ongoing detention for the motor vehicle infractions was lawful, certainly, 
but the decision to lock Mr. Aucoin in the cruiser dramatically increased 
the interference with his liberty and privacy interests. According to 
Moldaver J., the officer had the authority to do this, but only if reasonably 
necessary in the totality of the circumstances. The trial judge had not 
applied this test, and the evidence did not support a finding that the 
officer’s actions were necessary. The accused was thus unlawfully 
detained — and this deprived the pat-down search of any basis in law. 
Section 8 of the Charter was, accordingly, breached.90 
Having articulated the Charter breach in this way, Moldaver J. de-
termined that the admission of the cocaine into evidence would not bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. The officer was attempting to 
respect the accused’s rights throughout, and he was not merely following 
his usual practice in alcohol-related offences. Nor was he improperly 
searching for evidence when he patted down Mr. Aucoin’s pockets. In 
short, the officer made a mistake, but he was acting in good faith 
throughout.91 
Like Moldaver J., LeBel J. concluded that it was not reasonably nec-
essary for the officer to place Mr. Aucoin in the back of the police car as 
he wrote out the ticket. The officer’s subjective fear that the accused 
might “walk away” was not reasonable — Mr. Aucoin could have simply 
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waited for his ticket on the sidewalk. This much was consistent with 
Moldaver J.’s approach, but LeBel J. was prepared to go further. “Gener-
ally speaking”, he said, “detaining an individual in the locked rear seat of 
a police car in order to write out a ticket for a motor vehicle infraction 
will rarely strike an appropriate balance between the public’s interest in 
effective law enforcement and its interest in upholding the right of indi-
viduals to be free from state interference”.92 
With respect to the pat-down search, LeBel J. was again prepared to 
go further than Moldaver J. Like the majority, the minority holds that the 
search was unreasonable given that the detention was unlawful. For 
LeBel J., however, it was important to clarify that the search would have 
been unreasonable even if it had been reasonably necessary to lock the 
accused in the car. The officer testified that he conducted the search 
because it was his standard practice to do so. The officer had no reason to 
suspect that Mr. Aucoin was carrying a weapon. Moreover, the search 
went too far, going “beyond the scope of [a search] that was reasonably 
designed to locate weapons”.93 
Thus, LeBel J. saw the Charter breaches in this case to be more 
serious than Moldaver J. This is particularly reflected in his analysis 
under section 24(2). Justice LeBel concluded that the officer’s conduct 
was either ignorant of or wilfully disregarded Charter values, and 
therefore admitting the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.94 
Justice LeBel’s dissenting reasons do not once refer to the majority. 
They are written as an entirely different set of reasons — an alternative 
approach to the issues before the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the 
United States Supreme Court has described this form of dissent as the most 
effective.95 It can be read independently of the majority opinion, without 
undercutting the legitimacy of the reasons for the Court’s final order. 
7. R. v. S. (N.)96 
We come, finally, to S. (N.) — the niqab case. This is the only Charter 
decision of 2012 to fracture into three separate sets of reasons. The Chief 
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Justice wrote for a majority of four: herself and Deschamps, Fish and 
Cromwell JJ. Justice LeBel (with Rothstein J. concurring) agreed in the 
result, but for other reasons. Justice Abella dissented.  
S. (N.) concerned the difficult question of how to reconcile the sin-
cere religious convictions of a sexual assault complainant with the trial 
rights of the accused. The complainant, N.S., maintained that she had a 
sincere religious belief that she was required to wear a niqab in public 
when men (other than close relatives) might be present. The accused ob-
jected to her wearing the niqab while testifying, however, on the theory 
that it interfered with the trier of fact’s ability to assess her credibility 
and counsel’s ability to effectively cross-examine the witness — thereby 
infringing the Charter guaranteed right to a fair trial. At first instance, the 
preliminary inquiry judge questioned the sincerity of N.S.’s religious  
belief and ordered her to remove her niqab. She elevated the matter to the 
Superior Court, which quashed the order. The Court of Appeal remitted 
the matter back to the preliminary inquiry judge to re-determine the issue 
in accordance with its reasons.97 
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the net result was to dismiss 
the appeal and remit the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge.98  
According to the Chief Justice, (1) if a witness wears a niqab owing to a 
sincere religious belief, (2) she should be required to remove it while 
testifying in a criminal proceeding, if (a) this is “necessary to prevent a 
serious risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available al-
ternative measures will not prevent the risk”; and (b) “the salutory effects 
[of this], including the effects on trial fairness, outweigh the deleterious 
effects of doing so, including the effects on freedom of religion”.99 In this 
way, the conflicting rights would have to be balanced in each case. 
Justice LeBel (Rothstein J. concurring) agreed in the result — 
remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge — but preferred a 
clearer rule. To him, a witness should never be allowed to wear a niqab 
while testifying in a criminal proceeding. Though he agreed with the 
Chief Justice that the Court faced a clash between religious rights, on one 
hand, and the right to make full answer and defence, on the other, he held 
that the “equation” involved other factors — including the openness and 
religious neutrality of the justice system. According to LeBel J., it would 
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not be consistent with these constitutional values and traditions to permit 
a witness to wear a niqab while testifying.100 
Justice Abella also preferred a clearer rule, but she would have gone 
the other way. For her, the case should have been resolved with a clear 
direction that, where it is established that the witness has a sincere belief 
that she is required to wear a niqab (as here), she should always be 
permitted to wear it in court, unless the accused can demonstrate that her 
face is directly relevant (e.g., where identity is in issue). Otherwise, the 
harm of requiring the complainant to remove her niqab outweighs any 
damage to trial fairness.101 
S. (N.) is remarkable as a judicial work product. All three of the pos-
sible resolutions to the conflicting rights were addressed and defended by 
the Court: LeBel J. preferred an absolute prohibition; Abella J. empha-
sized the complainant’s interest in wearing her niqab; and the Chief 
Justice (for the majority) assumed the middle ground with a contextual 
balance of the competing rights. In sum, S. (N.) contains a rich spectrum 
of legal debate. 
There can be no doubt that the strengths and weaknesses of the 
majority and two minority opinions in S. (N.) will continue to be debated 
in civil society. It is difficult to predict, however, what will come of this 
dialogue. The majority has only really opened the door to the debate hall. 
It is one thing to say that two conflicting Charter rights ought to be 
balanced according to the Dagenais/Mentuck framework102 — it is 
another to actually carry this out on the ground. How does one put 
religious freedom and trial fairness into the same balance? Are these 
norms even capable of being weighed against one another? The opinions 
of LeBel and Abella JJ. will no doubt influence this ongoing debate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The seven Charter dissents (and concurrences) from 2012 provide a 
surprisingly rich illustration of the functions and features of dissenting 
opinions. Dissents do not, of course, fall neatly into categories — but 
2012 has delivered dissents that emphasize the goals of prophesy (R. v. 
St-Onge Lamoureux and, with any luck, Nedelcu and Aucoin); dialogue 
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(L. (S.) and S. (N.)); and the integrity of the judicial system (Cole). 2012 
also provided an instance of a justice expressly electing not to perpetu-
ally dissent (Dineley), and one dissenting opinion written entirely 
independent of the majority (Aucoin). All seven were outcome-oriented 
or (often, and) they used the language of “respect”. None undercut the 
majority. The 2012 Charter dissents were, all things told, an encouraging 
assortment. 
